On March 31 at 4pm, an unidentified flying object
crashed on the far flung South Korean island of Baengnyeong. Upon closer
examination, it was discovered that this was no flying saucer, but
rather a drone (UAV or unmanned aerial vehicle). There were no
identification marks on the hull, but study indicated that it was
designed and produced in North Korea .
It was not the first North Korean UAV to crash in South Korea in
recent weeks. Another drone crashed near the border city of Paju on
March 24.
The South Korean military did due diligence and made some rather
interesting discoveries. It turned out the first drone had flown over
the city of Paju (a satellite city north of Seoul, just on the border
with North Korea), before proceeding to fly over Seoul, where it got as
far as the Blue House (the residence of the president), taking
high-resolution pictures of important government and military
installations. Its equipment functioned properly and the quality of its
images was impressively high. Having completed its mission, it turned
north, but crashed before it could make it over the border.
This is the first time that North Korean drones have been discovered
inside South Korea. It has been known for some time that the North
Korean government has been pursuing the development of drones. It was
even reported in the North Korean media that Kim Jong-un had visited a
drone research facility some time ago. Nevertheless, one could dismiss
such claims as typical North Korean propaganda hype . The recent
discovery, though, demonstrates that North Korea's drone programme not
only exists but is also remarkably advanced.
Assuming that North Korea has a sufficient number of drones, it might
change the balance in intelligence capabilities between the two hostile
Korean states.
The US-South Korea alliance heavily relies
on technical intelligence - above all, satellite pictures. This ensures
that pretty much all significant military and industrial activity in
North Korea is conducted under a watchful electronic eye.
Until recently, North Korea had no access to similar kinds of
intelligence. Therefore, North Koreans had no alternative but to send
agents to infiltrate South Korea. Such missions were difficult, risky,
and from time to time went badly wrong - resulting in unwanted tension.
Many people still remember a North Korean submarine running ashore
on such a mission back in 1996. Its crew and the recognisance team they
were supposed to extract tried to escape through South Korean territory
and were chased by the South Korean military and police. This led to
numerous shoot-outs in which a number of people on both sides lost their
lives - among the victims were some civilians, who were shot by the
North Korean commandos for being unwanted witnesses.
Nonetheless, in spite of all the money spent and all the risks taken,
the North Korean government could not get access to sufficiently
reliable and up-to-date intelligence - until now, that is.
Bizarrely Leninist characteristic
The discovery of the North Korean drone programme - or rather that
the programme is actually operational - is also a reminder of a
bizarrely Leninist characteristic that North Korea has. While most of
its economy is hopelessly outdated and moribund, it is quite capable of
making remarkable progress in areas deemed to be politically and
strategically vital.
The country's missile and nuclear programmes are striking examples of
this. It is worth remembering that North Korea has a per capita GDP
little different from poor African countries, likely to be in the region
of $1,000 at best. Nonetheless, it has successfully developed
medium-range ballistic missiles and plutonium-based nuclear devices. It
is also working hard to develop long-range missiles and uranium-based
nuclear devices. It goes without saying that most countries in North
Korea's income bracket would struggle to manufacture good rifles, let
alone nuclear devices and medium-range ballistic missiles.
This paradox is actually quite typical for regimes of the North
Korean type. The Soviet Union, with its command-administrative economy,
was able to maintain the world's second most powerful military, even
though its economy was, by any normal standards, in poor shape. The
Soviet people had problems getting toilet paper, but the country was
still able to produce packs of tanks, hoards of fighter jets and swarms
of submarines.
Ironically, it was the centrally planned command economy that allowed
the government to concentrate resources in the military-industrial
complex. Thus the Soviet military successfully competed with the United
States armed forces until the early 1980s.
However, such successes came at a price. The ability to keep up with
the world leaders in a small number of select areas meant that the rest
of the economy was run very inefficiently and wastefully. The average
Soviet citizen was supposed to feel proud about the military might of
his country, as well as the achievements of Soviet athletes and chess
players. However, this pride was poor compensation for environmental
degradation, low quality consumption goods, and the dismal state of the
service industry. The Soviet missiles were more or less equal to those
of the US, but washing machines and refrigerators were not. In the long
run, the general inefficiency of the system sealed the fate of Leninist
socialists.
Similarly, the North Korean command economy entered terminal decline
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, just as the North Korean nuclear
programme was beginning in earnest.
The outside world should not forget about this feature of the North
Korean economy. Recently, a veteran military analyst from a major power
told me that: "If there is something constant in North Korean watching,
it is the constant tendency to underestimate technical capabilities in
the military realm." The discovery of this drone is a compelling
confirmation of this tendency. It is important that we keep this in
mind: North Korea is a serious military factor, and can create a lot of
mess if it wants to, at least for such a poor and otherwise backward
country.
Andrei Lankov is professor of Korean Studies at
Kookmin University, Seoul. He is the author of "The Real North Korea:
Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia".
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